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Abstract
Recent studies have confirmed a growing trend, especially among youngsters, of using
Online Social Media as favourite information platform at the expense of traditional mass
media. Indeed, they can easily reach a wide audience at a high speed; but exactly because
of this they are the preferred medium for influencing public opinion via so-called fake news.
Moreover, there is a general agreement that the main vehicle of fakes news are malicious
software robots (bots) that automatically interact with human users.
In previous work we have considered the problem of tagging human users in Online
Social Networks as credulous users. Specifically, we have considered credulous those users
with relatively high number of bot friends when compared to total number of their social
friends. We consider this group of users worth of attention because they might have a
higher exposure to malicious activities and they may contribute to the spreading of fake
information by sharing dubious content.
In this work, starting from a dataset of fake news, we investigate the behaviour and
the degree of involvement of credulous users in fake news diffusion. The study aims to:
(i) fight fake news by considering the content diffused by credulous users; (ii) highlight
the relationship between credulous users and fake news spreading; (iii) target fake news
detection by focusing on the analysis of specific accounts more exposed to malicious activ-
ities of bots. Our first results demonstrate a strong involvement of credulous users in fake
news diffusion. This findings are calling for tools that, by performing data streaming on
credulous’ users actions, enables us to perform targeted fact-checking.
keywords – Social Networks Analysis and Mining, Fake News, Twitter, Credulous Users
1 Introduction
Pervasiveness and ease of use of Online Social Media (OSM), like Twitter and Facebook, have
lead to new ways for people to keep up with news and for their propagation. Recent studies [1–
3] confirm the growing trend of using digital media as the favourite source of information,
especially among youngsters [4]. By routinely checking pages of interest and channels, people
get informed effortlessly. With OSM, publishers reach larger audience than with traditional
mass media, like newspapers, radio, etc., and news are disseminated easily and at a faster rate.
This has however brought concerns about the veracity of the news circulating on OSM. Fake
news and mis/disinformation [5] are well known problems, against which both government [6],
researchers [7] and social media administrators1,2 are struggling.
1Facebook: https://tinyurl.com/y3yzvpah
2Twitter: https://tinyurl.com/y3efs8s5
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Several approaches have been developed to counteract the spread of this phenomenon. Some
of them aim at detecting bots [8], i.e., automated accounts interacting with human users; oth-
ers use natural language processing (NLP) techniques [9] by analyzing the actual contents of
messages. In this work, we look at fake news from a different perspective, aiming to figure out
the extent of relationships between fake news and credulous users [10]. The latter are human-
operated accounts with a relatively high percentage of bot-followees among the total number
of their followees and are thus more exposed to bots’ malicious activities. The motivation for
studying the phenomenon from this perspective is twofold, indeed credulous users: (i) may
unconsciously contribute to fake news dissemination [11, 12]; (ii) may be affected by malicious
activities that are more effective when performed on a targeted audience [13, 14].
Starting from a publicly available dataset of fake news which concerned with politics and
gossips [15] published on Twitter, we have studied the involvements of credulous users in terms
of the number of their tweets with fake news they posted and the number of credulous that
have shared fakes. By jointly exploiting bot detection and credulous detection approaches [11],
we have seen that: (i) credulous users produce more fake news tweets than not-credulous ones;
(ii) credulous users publish less real news than fake ones and (iii) the extent to which credulous
publish fake news depends on the topic.
This findings are calling for tools that, by performing data streaming on credulous’ users
actions, enables us to perform targeted fact-checking. A possible exploitation of this could be
a system that, by attentioning credulous users performs on line data streaming by ”listening”
their activities (e.g., tweets, retweets, replies, mentions, etc.) in real time. As soon as a
credulous user publishes on his social dashboard, the tool could analyze the content, with,
e.g., text mining and/or NLP techniques, the reliability of the source. Obviously, to reduce
the amount of content to inspect, a key component of the system is the part concerned with
credulous detection that reduces the number of human-operated accounts to investigate. This
can be made more efficient by setting up a priority inspection measure, based on the content
production rate of credulous users, to firstly focuses on the more active ones.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 considers related works; Section
3 describes the used dataset and the approach we have followed; Section 4 illustrates the
experimental results; Section 5 discusses the main findings, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
This paper aims at investigating the relationship between credulous users and fake news; in
particular, the way the former behave in OSM and the extent to which they are involved in
spreading the latter using tweets. Rather than providing a complete literature review about
the many approaches to fake news detection, we concentrate just on work investigating on the
way bots’ activities influence humans in OSM. For comprehensive surveys on fighting fakes, we
refer the reader to other papers [7, 16].
An interesting study misinformation spreading in OSM is presented in [17]. The authors
analyzed 14 million of tweets published during 2016 U.S. presidential campaign and found non-
negligible evidence of the role that bots have had in fake news dissemination. Furthermore,
they identified specific vulnerability of humans that had been retweetting malicious bots; thus
actively contributing to fake news spreading.
The notion of susceptible users, i.e., OSM’s users who interact with bots, is introduced
in [18]. A binary classifier was trained to single out susceptible users; and the need of introducing
protection mechanisms in Social Media to prevent support of malicious activities by human-
operated accounts was advocated. Human-operated accounts “attacked” by bots through tweet
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mention are studied in [19] with the aim of predicting whether an interaction will start. Instead,
we consider those human users who have already started interacting with bots to discover the
extent of their involvement in spreading of fake news.
A live lab experiment testing the ability of social bots to shape or influence the social graph
of human-operated accounts in Twitter is presented in [20] and it is observed that the activities
of social bots can affect the links established between targeted users.
Starting from the definition of susceptible users [18] and with aims close to ours, the notion
of gullible users and their susceptibility to fake news is introduced in [21]. Five degrees of
susceptibility (referred to a user’s reply to a fake news) are defined and a multi-class classifier
is trained to predict users susceptibility level. The classifier achieves an AUC of 0.82. Indeed,
their aim is similar to ours, but we do not rely on users replies to deem them as credulous, but
on the number of bots they follow, and our objective is not a classification, but to find evidence
of their involvement in fake news spreading.
Beside the definitions of susceptible users [18] and gullible users [21], we mention our previ-
ous works [10,11,22] where credulous users have been studied. In [10] the concept of credulous
users has been introduced and heuristics have been used to label as credulous human-operated
accounts; humans are ranked by relying on the ratio between the number of bots (recognized
by a bot detector) they follows and their total number of followees3. A method for automat-
ically identifying credulous users, has been introduced in [11] for the first time. In this work,
classification performance achieved an accuracy of 93.27% and an AUC (Area Under the ROC
curve) of 0.93. From a perspective of regression, rather than for classification purposes, the
goal of the work in [22] has been to single out a technique for quantifying the percentage of
bot-followees, i.e., bots followed by human-operated accounts in Twitter. The best regression
model is trained with the SMOreg [23] algorithm, achieving a Mean Absolute Error of 3.62%.
The current paper differs in scope and strategy with our previous work. Its primary objective is
to investigate the way credulous users deal with fake news and to understand whether analyzing
credulous users profiles can be useful to support other fake news detection techniques. In this
case, the basic strategy relies on observing tweets containing fake news and their spreaders,
without considering any longer regression or classification.
3 Experimental Setup
3.1 Dataset
We take as starting point a publicly available dataset of fake news, called FakeNewsNet4 [7,15,
24]. For each item the following information is provided: a unique identifier (id), the publisher
(in url form), the content of the news (title), a list tweets (as Twitter ids) containing the news
and the information about its “veracity” (fake or real). To label the news, the authors in [15]
used two fact-checking websites: PolitiFact5 and GossipCop6 . In the former, fact-checking was
performed by politics experts (e.g., journalists) whom labelled news as fake or real. In the
latter, a numerical scores was assigned to news to indicate reliability, ranging from 0 (fake) to
10 (real).
Table 1 outlines the structure of the dataset. The original dataset contained 432 fake and
622 real political news (see in row Politic the column Original). However, on Twitter we were
31st dataset of credulous users: https://tinyurl.com/y6lod2yz
4FakeNewsNet Dataset: https://tinyurl.com/uwadu5m
5https://www.politifact.com/
6https://www.gossipcop.com/
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Table 1: FakeNewsNet Dataset: original and retrieved content
News Tweets
Original Retrieved Original Retrieved
P
o
li
ti
c F
a
k
e
432 392 165,356 141,421
R
ea
l
622 407 417,072 357,655
G
o
ss
ip
F
a
k
e
5,323 5,135 598,299 518,502
R
ea
l
16,817 15,759 881,627 812,719
only able to find tweets of 392 fake and 407 real news (column headed Retrieved). The number
of tweets (column titled Tweets) containing such news was initially of 165,356 on fake and
417,072 on real news; but we could find only 141,421 tweets related to fake news and 357,655
tweets related to real ones. The numerical mismatch between the original data and the retrieved
data is almost certainly due to deletion. Regarding the other topic, (row headed Gossip), out
of 5,323 fake and 16,817 real news, we got 5,135 and 15,759 news respectively. And it was
possible to find a total of 1,331,221 tweets; 518,502 related to fake news and 812,719 containing
real news. Obviously, in our study, we will only use retrieved data in both cases.
3.2 Experimental Approach
To pursue the goals of this work, we single out three sequential tasks: (i) tweets’ authors
identification, (ii) distinction between automated (bots) and human-operated authors, and (iii)
distinction between credulous and not-credulous users among the human-operated authors.
3.2.1 Tweets’ authors identification
In this phase, we aim to identify the Twitter accounts that published the tweets listed in
FakeNewsNet dataset, and thus their authors. Starting from the tweets’ id and using Twitter
API7, we collected 1,731,422 tweets out the original list of almost 2 million. It might be worth
noting that some tweets contain more than one news, and thus some tweets are counted more
than once in Table 1. This explains the numerical mismatch between the collected tweets and
retrieved ones (value’s sum of 4th column).
At the end of this phase, in addition to tweets’ data, we collected the profile’s data 8 of
536,513 Twitter accounts which are their authors.
3.2.2 Bot detection
The goal of this phase is to distinguish, among the set of authors obtained in the previous phase,
between human-operated accounts and bots. To this purpose, we used a bot detector (i.e., a
decision model able to recognize automated accounts) introduced in our previous work [11]. The
7Twitter API libraries: https://tinyurl.com/rfte3k2
8Twitter User Object: https://tinyurl.com/y5s5kpuw
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classification model is based on Random Forest [25], achieving an accuracy (instances correctly
classified) of 98.41% and an area under the ROC curve (AUC) of 1.00. It relies on a set of 30
features. Specifically, such features are obtained by combining the feature sets of Botometer+
and ClassA-. The reader is referred to [22] for details. For each users, Botometer+ considers
the timeline (the list of published tweets) and its mentions (the tweets that mention the user).
ClassA-’s, instead, relies on users’ profile data to determine their features8.
It is worth to notice that to retrieve the Botometer+’s features is needed a connection to
a web service9 and to classify tweets’ authors it is mandatory to obtain features from both
Botometer+ and ClassA-. In this way, 479,569 authors have been classified as human-operated.
3.2.3 Credulous classification
The last task aims at singling out credulous users among the human-operated authors. To
this purpose a refined version of the approach presented in [11], has been adopted. In [11] the
ground-truth was strongly imbalanced (316 credulous vs. 2,522 not-credulous). There, the set
of not-credulous users has been divided into smaller subsets, by a randomly instance selection
(without replacement), and each subset has cardinality equal to the number of credulous users.
Each subset of not-credulous users has been then merged with the credulous instances, creating
eight new “sub-datasets” called folds ; differing from each other for not-credulous instances only.
Then, for each fold, several decision models have been trained and cross-validated. The fold
OneR10 turned out to be the best performing one. But for some folds, other algorithms
(specifcally JRip11 and RepTree12) turned out to produce better models (see fold 4 and 5 in
Table 2).
Instead of classifying authors using the best classifier (which has been trained on just one
fold in [11]), for labelling authors we use all eight credulous classifiers in Table 2.
Specifically, the basic idea is that each author has to be classified by means of the classifier
evaluation metrics
Fold alg accuracy prec. rec. F1 MCC AUC
1 OneR 98.26 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
2 OneR 95.73 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.96
3 OneR 94.15 0.95 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.94
4 JRip 90.67 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.89
5 RepTree 91.93 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.90
6 OneR 90.35 0.92 0.90 0.90 0.82 0.90
7 OneR 90.93 0.92 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.91
8 OneR 96.65 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.93 0.97
Table 2: The eight Credulous Classifiers
trained on the fold most “similar” to it. Hence, for each human author singled out in Sec-
tion 3.2.2, the distance between author’s feature representation and the centroids of each fold is
computed. The author is then classified using the classifier trained on the fold whose centroid
9Botometer [26]: https://tinyurl.com/yytf282s
10OneR [27]: https://tinyurl.com/wgpezcp
11JRip [28]: https://tinyurl.com/ufke2zb
12RepTree [29]: https://tinyurl.com/qkl8nko
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is closest to it. Classifiers selection is performed with a specific tool we have implemented; and
350,622 human authors have been classified as credulous users.
3.3 Investigation targets
At this stage, we have all the information to study the relationships between fake news and
credulous users. In particular, we want to investigate potential relationships under three differ-
ent perspectives, aiming at understanding whether credulous users do significantly contribute
to fake news production and/or propagation in Twitter. First, we want to look for numerical
differences between the amount of fake and real news produced/diffused by the three categories
of user/author (namely, credulous/not-credulous and bots) and on both news’ topic. Second, we
want to compare the quantity of fake/real tweets, i.e., the tweets containing a fake/real news,
by contrasting first bots and humans and then credulous and not-credulous. To avoid that
the numerical unbalancing between fake and real tweets (e.g., see in Table 1 political retrieved
tweets) may lead to inaccurate observations we will also consider a randomly selected subset,
among the set of real-news tweets, with the same number of fake-news tweets. Third, we want
to quantify the authors’ level of involvement in fake news spreading/production by counting,
for each category, how many of them are authors of tweets containing: at least one fake news,
at least one real news, only fake news and only real news.
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present the experimental results, by relying on the approach described in
Section 3.2. We start by showing the results obtained for bot and credulous detection in
Table 4 (Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3).
Politc Gossip Union
#Bot 27,137 34,160 56,548
#Human 256,561 247,113 479,569
#Credulous 185,196 178,715 350,622
#Not-Credulous 71,365 68,398 128,947
Table 3: Bot Detector and Credulous detector outcomes
In the first column there are the different types of users; in the first macro-row the difference
is based on the “automation” of an account, the second macro-row reported the numbers of
human-operated accounts labeled as credulous or not-credulous users. Each column reports
the number of users which tweeted about a certain topic. We could not classify 396 accounts,
because the Botometer web service did not return features.
Table 4 reports the amount of news for each category of users, i.e., credulous/not-credulous
users and bots (1st column), for each topic (Politic or Gossip). The 2nd and the 3rd column,
(macro-column headed Politic), indicate the amount of political news, respectively fake and
real, that users have used in their tweets. The 4th and 5th column, instead, indicate the
number of real and fake news about the gossip, respectively.
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Politic Gossip
Fake Real Fake Real
Credulous 373 364 4,121 14,486
NotCredulous 361 366 4,768 13,418
Bot 350 332 4,470 15,050
Table 4: Users’ topic coverage by their tweets
With their tweets, credulous users cover 373 and 364 fake and real political news respectively.
The number of news covered by not-credulous users is 361 fake and 366 real political news. For
the sake of completeness, the same information is reported for bots too; the amount of news
covered by them is 350 fake and 332 real political facts.
When considering Gossip news, starting from a retrieved set of 5,135 fake news, we have
the following numbers: 4,121 by credulous users, 4,768 by not-credulous users and 4,470 by
automated accounts. For real news, we retrieved 15,759 tweet, of which 14,486 come from
credulous users, 13,418 from not-credulous and 15,050 from bots.
Table 5 and 6 provides a more detailed view of our experiments. For each category of users,
the number of tweets containing fake news (column FN ) and real news (column RN ) for both
politics (Table 5) and gossip (Table 6) news is reported. In both tables, the 4th column (called
RNrnd ) and 5th column (called RN*rnd) are introduced to mitigate the unbalance between
fake and real tweets, in accordance with the discussion in Section 3.3. With RNrnd we denote
a subset of RN whose entries have been randomly selected, from the original list of tweets of
Table 1, in order to have |RNrnd| = |FN |. While in RN*rnd, tweets are taken from the retrieved
list of Table 1 (|RN*rnd| = |FN(Tot.)| − |FN(n.a.)|).
FN RN RNrnd RN
∗
rnd
Tot. 165,356 417,072 165,356 141,421
Bot 19,888 45,924 18,120 18,013
n.a. 23,935 59,417 23,519 0
Human 121,533 311,731 123,717 123,408
Credulous 84,362 197,454 78,528 77,994
Not Credulous 37,171 114,277 45,193 45,414
Table 5: Number of tweets about political fact
7
Credulous Users and Fake News in Twitter A. Balestrucci and R. De Nicola
FN RN RNrnd RN
∗
rnd
Tot. 598,299 881,627 598,299 518,502
Bot 116,398 486,907 330,425 310,810
n.a. 79,797 68,908 46,552 0
Human 402,104 325,812 221,322 207,692
Credulous 244,690 209,579 142,246 133,518
Not Credulous 157,414 116,233 79,076 74,174
Table 6: Number of tweets about gossip fact
Table 5 presents the information related to the tweets on political fact. Almost 20k fake
tweets have been produced by bots, more than 121k fake tweets have been produced by human-
operated accounts; while for 24k fake tweets it has not been possible to retrieve their information
from Twitter (row named n.a.). When considering human users, we can see that the number
of fake tweets (FN ) published by credulous users (i.e., 84k) overcomes the number of those
published by not-credulous ones (i.e., 37k).
Credulous NotCredulous Bot
#Users Average St.Dev. #Users Average St.Dev. #Users Average St.Dev.
#Fake News≥ 1 54,828 1.54 2.79 19,525 1.90 5.05 9,622 2.07 4.53
#Real News≥ 1 138,113 1.43 2.91 57,839 1.98 10.22 45,924 2.36 9.11
Only Fake News 47,083 1.40 2.15 13,526 1.60 4.61 7,658 1.79 3.78
Only Real News 130,368 1.37 2.53 51,480 1.78 10.25 17,515 2.15 8.80
Table 7: Users that tweetted in political topic
Credulous NotCredulous Bot
#Users Average St.Dev. #Users Average St.Dev. #Users Average St.Dev.
#Fake News≥ 1 147,158 1.66 8.01 56,451 2.79 33.56 25.818 4.51 22.00
#Real News≥ 1 39,528 5.30 143.59 19,047 6.10 88.26 14,620 33.30 606.39
Only Fake News 139,187 1.45 6.97 49,351 1.81 6.51 19,540 2.39 12.79
Only Real News 31,557 1.35 2.96 11,947 1.52 4.72 8,342 2.19 10.95
Table 8: Users that tweeted in gossip topic
Although the tweets in RN are more numerous than FN, the number of tweets authored
by credulous overcomes that of not-credulous, but with a lower proportionality (197,454 by
credulous users and 114,277 by not-credulous users). But, because the #RN humans’ tweets are
almost three times the #FN ones, looking to the values related to RNrnd and RN*rnd columns
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can led to a better comparison. In fact, we can note that the number of real tweets published
by credulous users (in 4th and 5th column) are similar and in any case lower than in FN (see
Table 5). We preferred to use such subsets, rather than resorting to ratios and percentages,
in order to provide direct numerical differences. However, had we used percentages, nothing
would have changed. Obviously, we had to take into account that the percentage of FN tweets
from credulous users, out of the total set of human’s FN -tweets, is 60.85%, while the percentage
tweeted by not-credulous users is 39.15%.
As far as bots are concerned, despite RN ’s value seems higher then FN, the amount of fake
and real tweets is more or less the same (see the 4th and 5th column).
Switching to the case of tweets containing gossip news (Table 6), we can immediately notice
that, like Table 5, also here there is a superiority in tweet’s production by credulous users. In
particular, by focusing on the fake tweets column (FN ), we can see that even for this topic the
amount of tweets published by credulous users (244,690) is greater than not-credulous (157,414).
This superiority is confirmed even in all the RN ’s cases (see 3rd, 4th and 5th columns) but
with lower numbers. Surprisingly, by looking about bots, they authored a lot of real tweets,
precisely 468,907 (RN ), that represents more than the 50% of all real tweets; conversely, they
published only 116,398 fake tweets (FN), less than the 20% of Tot. FN.
Tables 7 and 8 present the results deriving by looking to what extent, for each topic, the
three categories of users (macro-columns’ headers in both tables), are participating. Specifically,
it is reported the amount of users that are authors of: at least a fake tweet (1st row, #Fake
News≥ 1 ), at least a real tweet (2nd row, #Real News≥ 1), only fake tweets (3rd row, #Only
Fake News) and only real tweets (4th row, #Only Real News). For each of this four cases,
the average and standard deviation have been calculated in both tables to show the fake/real
tweet’s rate and the uniformity of the users belonging to each of the aforementioned cases.
The results exposed in Table 7 are referred to the topic of political news. The amount of
credulous users that tweeted at least a fake news (1st row) is of 54,828, with publishing rate of
1.54 fake tweets on average and a standard deviation of 2.79. 138,113 credulous users have been
identified that published at least a real news (2nd row); and despite they are more numerous
than previous case, their related tweeting rate (average) is slightly lower (1.43) with an higher
standard deviation (2.91).
For what concern the amount of credulous users publishing only fake/real news (3rd and
4th line), we can observe a small numerical decrease in quantity. There are 47,083 credulous
authors with, 1.40 tweets with fake news on average and the standard deviation is of 2.15. In
the other case (4th row), 130,368 credulous users have posted only tweets of real news, with
almost the same average (1.37) as in its dual case but with an higher standard deviation (2.53).
As regards of not-credulous users, we can notice that the authors posted at least a tweet
containing a real news (2nd row) are 57,839, so almost 3 times than the users with at least a
fake tweets (1st row), i.e.,19,525. The averages are similar in both cases, 1.98 for Real News
and 1.90 for Fake News ; the respective standard deviations are high too, 5.05 (1st row) and
10.22(2nd row). By observing those authors tweeted only fake/real news (3rd and 4th line),
we can observe a similar trend to the same case of credulous, but with a much lower level of
participation. In fact, despite the not-credulous authors posted only tweets of real news (51,480)
are more than the ones published only fake tweets (13,526), these latter are only a third of the
number of credulous users who only publish fake news. Furthermore, the not-credulous users’
tweeting rate of real news (average) is also higher than the one referred to who is posting only
fake news.
For sake of comparison to human accounts, in Table 7 are also reported the results related to
bots. We can see a certain disparity between the number of bots tweeting Fake News (i.e, 9,622
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as indicated in 1st row) and Real News (i.e., 45,924 as indicated in 2nd row). On the other hand,
by comparing the previous data with the ones related to bots authoring only fake/real news
(3rd and 4t line), we can see: (i) a reduction equal to more than 2 times about bots tweeting
only real news (17,515 in 4th line w.r.t the case in the 2nd line), and (ii) a little reduction for
what concern the amount of bots sharing only fake news in their tweets (7,658 in 3rd line, w.r.t.
1st line). The tweeting averages per bots are upper than the human’s cases; and the standard
deviations have higher values when referred to real news (9.11) and only real news (8.80).
The outcomes concerning to gossip topic are presented in Table 8. Starting by the 1st
macro-column (headed, credulous), we can see a big amount of authors having at least one
fake-news tweet (147,158), and this numerical superiority occurs even when we count the ones
tweeting only fake news (139,187). Conversely, about the authors of real news’ tweets, 39,528
credulous users have at least one and 31,557 published only real tweets. By looking the details
corresponding to the category of not-credulous users, we can see a good downsizing of fake news’
authors. Precisely, there are 56,451 users that tweetted at least one fake news, and 49,351 users
that published only fake news in their tweets. Moreover, we observed the same decreasing
trends also in both cases of real news published by not-credulous authors. In particular, the
authors published at least one real news are 19,047 (2nd row), whereas the ones published only
real news are 11,947.
Lastly, as in Table 8, we conclude by reporting the numerical details referred to the auto-
mated accounts (bot, 3rd macro-column). We can summarize by saying that, the tweeting bots
of at least a fake news are 25,818 and those ones published only fake are 19,540; more than the
ones publishing real news, which are 14,620 (2nd row) and 8,342 (4th row). With regard to the
average and standard deviation, the values are very high compared to the other lines, especially
on standard deviation. In general, the averages of the bots is higher than both credulous and
not-credulous users, regardless the news’ veracity in their tweets.
From these results we can derive very interesting findings that will be exposed and discussed
in the following Section 5.
5 Discussion
The experimental results described in the previous section, shed light on the connections be-
tween fake news and credulous users, and on the extent the latter are involved in spreading fake
news on Twitter. Here we provide some considerations about the experimental results along
the three perspectives introduced in the Section 3.3. Specifically, we consider
• News : the differences between the number of fake and real news spread by credulous,
not-credulous and bots.
• Tweets : the number of tweets containing either fake or real news posted by bots and
humans and credulous and not-credulous.
• Activities : the number of users tweet at least one fake news, at least one real news, and
only fake or real news.
In addition, we provide some recommendation concerned with online monitoring of credulous
users.
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5.1 News
The different behaviour of credulous and not-credulous users relatively to fake news, is made
manifest in Table 4. We can see that the tweets produced by credulous users cover 95% of the
retrieved fake news concerned with politics, while those produced by not-credulous cover 92%.
Instead, for non fake news, credulous users “talk” about the 91% of the total retrieved, which
is almost the same of not-credulous users.
When considering gossiping news, the situation is a bit different. Specifically, on the one
hand, the percentage of fake news covered by the credulous users’ tweets is 80%, while not-
credulous users’ tweets 93% (see Table 1). On the other hand, not-credulous users “talk” of
86% of the retrieved true news, while the coverage of credulous users is of 92%. This may seem
counter-intuitive, but we have to stress the numerical imbalance between the amount of fake
(more than 5k) and real gossip news (more than 15k). Moreover, in Table 1, we consider as
covered any news (re)twitted just once. In fact, considering the amount of tweets (Table 6) can
be more informative.
From this first perspective, we can say that news do catch credulous users’ interest, especially
when fake content is concerned (80% gossips vs. 95% politics). In future work, we plan to
investigate along new directions, by considering other topics such as technology or medicine.
5.2 Tweets
Regardless of news’ veracity, from Table 5, the low number of tweets made by bots compared to
human-operated accounts attracts attention. This is mainly due to the disproportion between
the amount of bots and humans (see Table 4), that confirms the statement in [26] where the
percentage of bots in Twitter is estimated to range from 9% to 15%; in our case is 10,52%. By
looking to the human-operated accounts, we can see that the tweets authored by credulous users
are always more then those from the accounts classified as not-credulous. This was expected
about fake news; however, it was unexpected for the other news. Indeed, it would be a bit
extreme to expect that credulous users are active exclusively on fake news; however, it has
also be taken into account that the amount of retrieved tweets of real news is more than three
times the amount of fake ones. This can be observed by considering the 4th row in Table 5
(by comparing the columns headed FN and RN ); we think that looking to the values in 3th
(RNrnd) and 4th (RN
∗
rnd) columns would lead to a fairer comparison. Concerning these two
columns (for real tweets), it appears that credulous users are authors of fewer real news tweets
than fake ones, differently from not-credulous users.
As already mentioned in Section 4, also for gossips (Table 6), there is a downward trend
between the amount of fake news tweets and real news ones for both categories of human-
operated accounts. In this case, the situation is peculiar because the number of RN is just
less than FN one; hence, considering the values related to the reduced set of real tweets (i.e.,
the column headed RNrnd and RN
∗
rnd) is somehow pointless. The fact that the amount of
not-credulous users’ real tweets does not overcome the number of the fake ones, can be justified
by a strong bot’s authorship. In fact, the number of tweets done by bots on real news exceeds
the number of its fake counterpart by more than 4 times (3 times if we consider the restricted
sets RNrnd and RN
∗
rnd). A further motivation may be due to the fact that gossip is a more
attractive topic than politic and with a potential larger audience. In addition, traditional mass
media (e.g., television, radio, newspapers, etc.) can be used to check “veracity” of political
news, while it is more difficult to do the same for gossips. However, we want just to emphasize
the threat of the fake news, and even in this case the credulous users “win” for number of fake
tweets.
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5.3 Activities
Further findings can be derived by observing the users’ numerical participation, in each news’
topic (Tables 7 and 8). It is worth to say that, in such tables, when we talk on the numbers
related to real and fake news, we refer to the respective total set (FN and RN ).
Concerning political topics (Table 7), we can claim that, despite there are more credulous
users publishing at least a real news, the related tweet’s average is lower than the case when at
least a fake news has been posted. It is also important to consider that the number of tweets
of real political news is more than 410k, almost 3 times the amount of fake ones. Conversely,
the (numerical) presence of not-credulous users tweetting fake news is limited.
In the gossip’s case (Table 8), we can see that, contrarily to what observed for the quantita-
tive analysis of tweets (Table 6), the number of credulous users who publish fake news is much
higher than those who publish real ones. Furthermore, the fact that the number of tweets with
real news posted by credulous users is relatively high suggests that they tweet at greater inten-
sity. And this even explains the unexpected high number (in Table 6) of real-tweets published
by credulous users. An additional confirmation of this fact is given by observing just the au-
thors of only real or only fake news. In this case, the amount of credulous users’ that tweet real
news is much lower than its fake equivalent. On the opposite, for not-credulous users, we see a
smaller presence in fake news cases; and, despite their number overcomes that of not-credulous
users that diffuse real news, the proportionality is significantly lower but with a higher average
of real news’s tweets (#Real News ≥1 ) authorship.
Although the bots have been included just for comparative purposes and the study of their
involvement in fake news dissemination is not the main concern of our work, we can notice
that they have the highest tweet’s publishing rate compared to both categories of human-
operated accounts. Although, from the study, their involvement in fake news spreading does
not numerically emerge, we do think that they are among the main actors in this malicious
activity and other literature provides some evidence. However, also in our study their malicious
activity can this can be indirectly noticed by considering the average values of their fake-tweeting
rate, which is higher than those of both categories of human-operated accounts.
To conclude this section, we can resume our findings in the following statements:
1. Topics (politics vs gossips) play a key role in determining the amount of fake news pub-
lished and circulating in social media, due to the size of potential audience and to the
number of methods available for fact-checking;
2. For both topics, credulous users do spread a higher amount of fake news than not-credulous
users, but they do not publish only fake contents;
3. A high number of credulous users has a strong involvement in posting fake news;
4. Automated accounts, which in general have a higher rate of tweets publication than
humans, exhibit a good uniformity between fake and real content published.
5.4 Monitoring recommendations
Despite bots’ tireless activity, the findings of this work shows active humans’ participation in
spreading fake news. A possible way of taking advantage of our work is the design of a self-
adaptive and evolving system that, by focusing on the data stream published by credulous users’
activity, carefully inspects what they publish in OSM, with targeted fact-checking. The tool
could be based on processes that intelligently exploit the data stream coming from credulous
users as soon as these publish content on their dashboards. Then, by using text mining and/or
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NLP techniques, the tool could analyze such contents (tweets, retweets, replies, mentions, . . . )
in real-time, and, of course, the reliability of the source. This would considerably reduce the
set of human users to scrutiny and, indirectly, the number of tweets, to perform targeted fact-
checking. This tool could further evolve by targeting credulous more efficiently in order to
further narrow the group of credulous users to analyze. For instance, by considering content
production’s rate of credulous users (to pay more attention to the more active ones), or the
number of followers.
Such a tool, could be used by OSM administrators to hold up some of credulous users’ activ-
ities (e.g., content re-posting) in order to slow down the propagation of malicious information.
6 Conclusion
Nowadays Online Social Media are very important and the channel of information, preferred
by people, especially by youngsters, to traditional media, like newspapers, radio and television.
Their pervasiveness, favoured by the widespread use of mobile devices, and people’s compulsive
check of their social profiles has enabled faster news dissemination and a wider audience. This
has brought one of the bigger problem of our time, misinformation. The absence of any control
of the news published on OSM, sort of common in newspapers, has stimulated production and
diffusion of fake news. In many cases, this is done using automated accounts, called bots,
which actively interact with people to induce bias in their opinion, generate misconception,
incite hate-speech, etc. Current approaches, which effectively counter malicious bots activities,
are based on their detection and removal from OSM. But whenever a bot is removed, it is easy
to introduce new ones that are able to deceive detectors, giving rise to an arms race between
botnet masters and OSM’s administrators.
Inspired and stimulated by recent literature, that stresses the susceptibility of human-
operated accounts to activities of malicious bots, we have studied the relationship between
fake news and so called credulous Twitter users, i.e., human-operated accounts following a high
percentage of bots over their social contacts.
Starting by a publicly available dataset of fake and real news (concerned with politics and
gossips) and by using bots and credulous detectors, we provided evidence of the actual involve-
ment of credulous users in the diffusion/production of fake news. The experimental results
showed that, regardless of the news topic, credulous users tweet a larger number of fake news
than not-credulous one. Although this superiority is also confirmed for the number of tweets
containing real news, it is worth saying that: (i) real news are harmless and (ii) the number
of such tweets is still lower than those containing fake news. Furthermore, we observed the
numerical participation of users, counting how many of each category have tweeted fake and/or
real news; in this case we noticed a discordance depending on the news’s topic. Credulous who
have tweeted true political news, are in greater numbers than those who have published fake
news, unlike the case of gossip news. But either way, the number of credulous users tweeted
fake news is always higher than the number of not-credulous users.
Because of this, we are pretty sure about the contribution of credulous detection techniques
for improving fake news detectors; they would make it possible to focus on the content posted
by credulous users using NLP and text mining techniques. We believe that the study of this
category of users can help researchers to better understand misinformation and users’ polar-
ization phenomenons and can give an extra edge to fight the propagation of fake news. It is
worth to notice that the application of this kind of approach, that focuses on credulous users,
is dependent from the classification performance of the adopted bot and credulous detectors.
Among the possible future work research directions, we plan to check if the findings of this
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work are confirmed by using other fake news datasets and apply fake news detection approaches
(based on NLP and content inspection) to credulous users’ tweets.
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